Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto: Objections and Responses

Tommie Shelby

In parsing Shelby's theory in Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto, I came up with a reduced form argument that I believe is a holistic representation of the author's claims as it relates to civic obligation and the duties those in our society have towards it: 

1. Society functions as a system of social cooperation

2. Justice ensures the continuity of social cooperation within society.

3. Civic obligations are the duties citizens owe to one another, but only within a just society

4. When society is sufficiently unjust, individuals treated unfairly lack the same basic means to improve their living conditions as those treated fairly.

5. Despite lacking the same basic means, those treated unfairly still have the same rights to pursue essential needs, such as food, shelter, education, and a basic standard of living.

6. Since individuals treated unjustly retain the right to pursue these essential needs, they are justified in pursuing these ends in ways that may conflict with civic obligations.

7. Those living in dark ghettos in the United States are treated sufficiently unjustly and do not have the same basic means to improve their living conditionsC) Those living in dark ghettos in the United States are not bound by civic obligation 

Potential Objections: 

This argument's premises can be questioned thoroughly. I'll critique four of his points and restate what I believe is the strongest and what Shelby might think at the end.

P1: Does society function as a system of Social Cooperation?

It can be questioned whether society functions through cooperation or whether individuals act primarily out of their own self-interest with apparent cooperation stemming from deterrents to act otherwise, such as penalties and laws. Are we coerced into cooperation due to fear of punishment? Given the history of exploitation of poor Black communities in the US, Is it really fair to call society cooperative? Shelby assumes a more cooperative society than may actually exist.

P2: Does justice ensure the continuity of social cooperation within society

P2 is also debatable on similar grounds. Justice may provide the illusion of social cooperation, but the word "ensure" confirms a much more egalitarian theory that rectifies the goodness in society than the word "promote" would do, which I believe is more accurate.

P5: What are rights, and do we really have them?

Lastly, to counter P5 and take a similar approach to those of my first two arguments, one (not I) may argue that humans have no obligations to each other and that rights are a human concept. The value of a human is solely their use-value; if a majority doesn't have a use for a minority, then there is nothing binding it to help the minority. While this may be a cruel view, it exposes Shelby's egalitarian commitment to defining society. 

P6: Are citizens justified in pursuing these ends in ways that may conflict with civic obligations?

Even if we accept the premises thus far, Shelby's claims that unjustly treated individuals can completely relinquish civic obligation are too strong. Civic Obligations shouldn't be all or nothing. Some can remain intact even in unjust conditions. To really strengthen the argument, Shelby should differentiate between what should and shouldn't be obliged to do in unjust situations.

My arguments with P1, P2, and P5 were all Bentham-style utilitarianism and can be used as a tool (pun intended) to expose gaps or inspire thought. However, I do not believe they're strong critiques if we engage Shelby's text charitably. Because of this, the best argument lies in P6.

Strongest Argument: P6

Shelby's argument provides only two options. The relinquishment of duties of civic obligation or retaining all civic obligation. According to Shelby, one is allowed to disrespect the law, which disrespects the law entirely or respect the law. It's a dichotomy.

I believe that this argument is incomplete. To show this, I'll provide an example of a theoretical neighborhood: X. X has an exceedingly above-average poverty line, policing, and crime rate and is woefully underinvested in by the city and all of its industry. However, its schools are significantly better than other similar neighborhoods and provide its students with at least as good of a chance as 50% of other schools in the city to go to college or achieve social mobility. Do the people living in this neighborhood have the right to relinquish their civic obligations? Shelby's argument would say no, but he might say yes. His all-or-nothing approach leaves out neighborhoods that may have some redeeming qualities as he focuses on the deepest of injustices, which are, most of the time, exceptions rather than the rule. It also may be too broad if he does in fact believe that people in a neighborhood like X may relinquish all civic obligations. To make his argument more convincing, he needs to give more than a blanket overview about a specific arrangement in which his argument checks out. While it is an important and useful principle, it would fail as is if applied to real-world scenarios.

To counter this point, Shelby may claim that the theoretical town X is of less concern. The ghetto he's concerned with represents the worst injustice in a community. Although there may be fewer people living in these dark ghettos than there are living in neighborhoods with a few good qualities, the pervasive, obscene, and palpable injustice faced by those who have been failed by society in every way may justify relying on self-sufficient means in a way that a neighborhood with an opportunity of escape may not. Ultimately, Shelby believes that respect of law and civic obedience is a good and sacred thing and must only be violated when necessary and in the least likely way to cause violence. Although it may be tempting to grant X a leave of its civic obligations, it isn't among the cases in which it is necessary and is therefore unjustified.